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Trading Blocs in the Twenty-First Century
Complexity and Consequences
Francesco Duina

Introduction
Trading blocs such as the EU, NAFTA, Mercosur, and APEC have become
an important feature of the changing international political-economic
order. Without question, most have similar basic objectives: above all,
the liberalization of trade. Yet, they also differ on several important dimensions, ranging from their specific economic objectives to their levels of
legitimacy. These differences reflect, in part, the plethora of factors driving
integration, from 'rational' ones-such
as national responses to faltering
multilateralism-to
more sociological ones-such as taken-for-granted assumptions about what modern legitimate governments should pursue.
Unsurprisingly, given all this, integration has at once progressed at a
different pace in different blocs and generated significant challenges for
the member states.
All this suggests that trading blocs are complex projects that defy simple
description or generalizations. I explore this complexity in Sections I-IV of
this chapter. In Section V, I reflect on its multifaceted implications for the
regional expansion of economic actors and the rise of the international
economy.

1. Dimensions of difference
Trading blocs occur whenever two or more nations agree to liberalize trade
across their borders via the removal of a combination of tariff and non-tariff
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barriers (NTBs).l According to the WTO, nearly 200 blocs were in force at the
start of 2010.2 If blocs currently being negotiated, signed but not yet in force,
and those in the proposal stages are taken into account, the figure exceeds
400. With the exception of perhaps fewer than fifteen countries (for instance,
Madagascar and San Marino), every nation on earth belongs to one or more
trading blocs. Some countries, such as Switzerland, participate in over twenty.
Others, such as the United States and]apan, belong to approximately ten. The
majority participate in five or fewer. The result is an intricate pattern of relationships that is quite difficult to capture in any simple graphic or diagrammatic
depiction (Bhagwati 2008: 63). The sudden growth in the number of these
blocs-most came into existence in the 1990s and 2000s-has made matters
even more difficult to track. In Asia, for instance, there was a single bloc in 1995
and a stunning Sixty-one by 2010 (Wignaraja and Lazaro 2010: 8).
Trading blocs have generated important new regional realities. Any discussion of capitalism in the twenty-first century should therefore examine these
blocs. The first step for doing so is to grasp and make sense of their variety:
while they are all manifestations of a desire to liberalize trade among nations,
major differences set them apart. Four dimensions of difference are especially
important: economic objectives, frameworks and policies for the attainment
of those objectives, political purposes, and levels of legitimacy.
Economic objectives
The most obvious difference concerns the stated economic objectives. All
blocs aim at trade liberalization, but the extent to which liberalization should
be pursued varies dramatically. Recall that goods, capital, services, and labour
are the essential components of any economy. Given this, we can distinguish
among four basic types of blocs, ordered from the least to the most widereaching: free trade areas, customs unions, common markets, and economic
and monetary unions.
In the lightest and most common cases of integration-free trade areasmember states agree to liberalize trade primarily for goods. Selected services
and capital are also often included-as is the case for NAFTA,the ASEANFree
Trade Area (AFTA)along with the relevant side agreements, and the European
Free Trade Association (EFTA).To be in line with WTO regulation, free trade

1 Some blocs are agreements between already-constituted blocs (Mercosur-EU, for instance) or
between one or more nations and a bloc (ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand, for instance). For the sake
of simplicity, throughout this chapter I refer to blocs as agreements among nations. All of the
empirical examples I consider, moreover, involve blocs with more than two member states-for
these tend to be the most important.
2 For up-to-date figures, see the WTO's database on regional trading agreements: http://rtais.wto.
org/Ul/PublicAIIRTAList.aspx
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areas (much like other blocs) must comply with General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) Article XXIV, which asks that the reduction of
tariffs should cover 'substantially all trade' and that member states not
adopt protectionist measures towards third parties that are on the whole
more restrictive than those in place prior to the bloc's formation. The term
'substantially' leaves open the possibility of significant exceptions. Many
experts agree that it implies a reduction of at least 8S per cent of existing
tariffs among the member states, but this is disputed (Wignaraja and
Lazaro 2010: 14). Thus, partly as a result of this, we observe considerable
variation across blocs in terms of the percentage of goods actually moving
freely across national borders, though textiles and agriculture continue to
be among the most protected sectors in most blocs (Suominen 2009: 38).
We also observe varying compliance with the requirement that member
states not increase their overall protectionist stances vis-a-vis third parties,
with free trade areas showing lesser protectionist tendencies than customs
unions or common markets.
Customs unions are similar to free trade areas but introduce common
external tariffs (CETs) and possibly other trade policies vis-a-vis non-member
countries. The logic behind CETs is to prevent producers in anyone member
state from having access to cheaper materials than producers in any other
member state-something
that would jeopardize internal trade much like a
tariff barrier among the member states. CETs also give the member states a
coordinated way of protecting themselves against foreign competitors and
markets, though in principle only when in compliance with GATT Article
XXIV. A good example of a customs union is the Southern African Customs
Union. There also exist blocs, such as the East African Community, which, on
their way to becoming common markets or more, become customs unions as
an official stepping stone.
Common markets take aim at all four key elements of an economy-goods,
capital, services, and labour-and rely as well on CETs. Given their ambitious
coverage, they are fairly rare. At the same time, some of the most important
trading blocs in the world-that is, Mercosur, the Andean Community (CAN),
and the EU-are common markets. Economic and monetary unions encompass all the elements of common markets plus the adoption of a single
currency and coordination in key macroeconomic policy areas. A portion of
the EU-the eurozone-and the West African Economic and Monetary Union
offer examples.
Frameworks and policies
There is no simple formula for the pursuit of economic integration. Given two
blocs with identical objectives, those charged with translating vision into
49
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reality have at their disposal a variety of instruments. We observe important
overlaps but also variations in those instruments across blocs.
In virtually all blocs, officials rely on the reduction or outright elimination
of tariffs on goods. The most critical differences here concern the schedule for
that reduction. GATTArticle XXIV specifies only that the tariff reduction 'plan
or schedule for its [a bloc's] formation is within a reasonable length of time'.
Thus, in some blocs the reduction is in theory immediate (i.e. SingaporeAustralia). In others, it should occur within five years (i.e. South Korea-United
States). In yet others, the period can extend to a decade or more (i.e. NAFTA).
Interestingly, Asian blocs are generally rather aggressive with their timing
(Suominen 2009). Moreover, within a given bloc, different schedules are likely
to apply to different industrial sectors.
NTBs include quotas, subsidies, fiscal incentives, and other instruments
designed to protect from foreign competition or simply help in financial
terms particular sectors of the economy. As tariffs decline, NTBs acquire
increased significance (Helble, Shepherd, and Wilson 2009). Moreover, NTBs
are key for the liberalization of trade in services, capital, and labour. Blocs
differ greatly in the sorts of NTBs that they tackle-and these differences are
not simply correlated with the stated objectives of blocs (establishing a free
trade area, for instance, instead of a common market). We also note, again,
certain geographical patterns whereby, for example, blocs in the Americas are
more likely to focus on NTBs than those in Asia (Suominen 2009: 44).
Another type of NTBs are regulatory differences across member states in
important areas such as the environment, workers' rights, product safety and
quality, and antitrust. These differences can translate into cost asymmetries
that can undermine trade. Regulatory harmonization can be a daunting task.
In some blocs, officials have embraced it (for instance, the EU and Mercosur),
but in others they have opted to rely on the principle of mutual recognition
(as with EFTAand NAFT A). In yet other instances (AFT A, for example), officials
have adopted a mixed approach (Duina 2006a).
These instrumental differences are accompanied by variation in another
area: the organizational architecture of blocs. Some official body or combination of actors has to produce laws or agreements on tariffs and NTBs. Compliance must be monitored. Conflicting claims inevitably arise and must be
addressed. What have countries agreed upon as the appropriate organizational
structures for managing these tasks? As Table 2.1 indicates with reference to
ten representative blocs, officials have chosen primarily between intergovernmental and supranational institutions (Hancock 2009). In the former case,
delegation of authority is given to representatives of the member stateswhose mission remains the advancement of their countries' interests. Bargaining takes place with national interests in mind. In the latter case, individuals
from the member states are charged with safeguarding and advancing the
50
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Table 2.1. The organizational architecture of blocs
Supranational Institutions

# of Permanent
Institutions

None

One

Two or More

Three or More

No example exists

EU, CAN,

Two or Less

NAFTA, EFTA, AFTA,
APEC

CARlCOM,
SADC
COMESA

Mercosur
No example
exists

bloc's interests and objectives. As Table 2.1 also shows, member states have
made different choices about the appropriate number of institutions charged
with advancing integration.
As is well known, the ED sports an impressive supranational architecture
and numerous institutions. But CAN, with its three supranational bodies (a
court of justice, parliament, and commission) is not very different, at least on
paper (Alter and Helfer 2010). With its many institutions (including a new
parliament and a court of justice), Mercosur belongs to the same group. By
contrast, blocs like NAITA, EITA, AITA, and APEC are intergovernmental
(Capling and Nossal 2009; Narine 2004). They are also reliant on very few
institutions to manage their affairs. Other blocs lie in between these two ends
of the spectrum. These include the South African Development Community
(SADC), the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), and the Common Market
for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), all of which have one supranational body (a court of justice). They differ in terms of number of institutions,
with COMESAhaving the fewest.

Political purposes
The primary goal of Virtually all trading blocs is economic. Yet, when one
examines the foundational treaties or later agreements, explicit references to
political objectives often appear, as is the case for instance with SADC, where
security, peace, and the pursuit of 'common political values' are recognized as
primary objectives (Article 5 of SADC Treaty). Sometimes trading blocs are
formed in the context of pre-existing political agreements, as has happened
in ASEANwith the adoption of AITA in 1992. In those cases, the full purpose
of a trading bloc can only be understood in reference to those agreements.
Additionally, in all cases, blocs have unofficial political purposes that
cannot, or need not, be put into formal writing. Thus, any given bloc is likely
to have multiple, complex, and sometimes evolving sets of political objectives. Easy categorizations are therefore impossible, though it is probably the
case that deeper forms of economic integration often come with more
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ambitious political aspirations. We proceed below by discussing some of the
most salient political purposes and the blocs where they are most readily
observable.
We can distinguish between internal and external political purposes. One of
the most common internal purposes is the coordination of government policies in sensitive areas such as migration, terrorism, labour markets, and industrial development. Coordination can include data collection and sharing,
joint identification and articulation of problems, and cooperation on devising
solutions. Aware that real benefits can result from these sorts of initiatives,
member states at times pursue economic integration with the hope that it will
lead to coordination in other areas later on. The EU and Mercosur are cases in
point (Ielin 1999). In other instances, policy coordination emerges as a new
goal, as happened for instance among members of APECin 2001 in the area of
security with their adoption of the APEC Leaders Statement on CounterTerrorism and subsequent initiatives (Despeignes 2004).
But more basic political objectives are sometimes on the minds of member
state leaders. In Africa and Asia, stable and democratic countries have often
worried about the possibility of government breakdowns or dictatorships in
neighbouring countries. In South America, Paraguay comes to mind. Poorer,
much smaller, and with a higher likelihood to revert back to dictatorships
than its neighbours, Paraguay was invited to join Mercosur partly as a way to
give Argentina and Brazil influence over its political system (Hakim 1996).
Similar arguments have been made for NAFfA in the case of Mexico (McConnell and MacPherson 1994: 170). Lastly, the rapid eastward enlargement of
the EU after the collapse of the Soviet Union was seen by many as a way of
'locking in' the newly freed but still potentially volatile countries.
Related to these fears is yet another political objective: the prevention of
wars among the member states. Historically, countries with very interdependent economies have been less likely to go to war with each other than
countries with less in common. The founding of the EU reflected European
fears that Germany might one day cause trouble again in the continent
(Milward 1992).
Some of the weightiest political considerations, however, have to do with
external political purposes. Countries-especially
poorer or smaller onesview integration as a valuable pooling of resources to face external geopolitical threats. Caribbean countries established CARICOM in the 1970s with the
expressed objective of coordinating their foreign policies in a Cold War
context where, individually, they counted for little. In Asia, countries have
pursued economic integration to strengthen their position vis-a-vis other
blocs or powerful countries (McConnell and MacPherson 1994: 167; Switky
2000).
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Legitimacy
Legitimacy is in the eye of the beholder. When it comes to blocs, two very
different types of beholders exist: citizens and actors (organizations, political
parties, associations, etc.) inside a bloc, and those outside (other nation states,
other blocs, international organizations, etc.). Even allowing for this, it is fair
to suggest that some blocs enjoy overall more legitimacy than others-with
the variation being a function, among other things, of the objectives, history,
institutional efficiency, compliance rates, and recent success of those blocs.
NAFTA,the EU, Mercosur, and APECare perhaps among the most legitimate
blocs, though of course they face plenty of criticisms as well." Average public
support for those agreements (the EU and NAFTAin particular) is relatively
high," while, at the international level, officials from other governments and
blocs take those blocs seriously and seek to maintain good relations with
them. CAN, CARICOM, and AFTA probably enjoy less, but nonetheless a
real, amount of legitimacy both internally and externally. By contrast, some
blocs, such as COMESA and several others in Africa, lack any significant
amount of legitimacy (Mistry 2000; West & Central Africa Monitor 200S).

2. Drivers of integration
What has prompted countries all over the globe to establish regional trading
blocs? From a substantive angle, we can distinguish between variables active at
the global and regional levels (Farrell 200S: 2). Some analysts view blocs as
responses to failure by the WTO and multilateralism more generally to further
the causes of free trade or as defensive moves against the threats of an emerging
global economy and global instability (Sbragia 2008; Bhagwati 2(08). Other
analysts, by contrast, point to dynamics within regions-typically the interests
of local business and political actors, and economic complementarities (Mattli
1999). Such distinction may not be very useful since global and regional-level
variables always interact with each other. A more incisive approach may prove
more fruitful.
Scholars of various intellectual orientations-rational
choice theory, realists,
neo-institutionalists, constructivists, and others-have articulated various accounts of what drives regional integration. By and large, we can group them

3 In NAFfA, for instance, the Zapatista movement in Mexico was launched precisely on the day
NAFfA was enacted as a way to protest the agreement. The EU, in tum, is routinely criticized for its
'democratic deficit'.
4 For data on public support of NAFfA, see Bennett's discussion of what percentages of
Americans (58 per cent) and Canadians (66 per cent) perceive NAFTA to be beneficial (2004:
1298), though these numbers have shifted over time (Hall and Nelson 2004).
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into two camps. In the first (what we may call the rationalist camp), we find
those inclined to view national governments and their leaders as calculating
actors seeking to maximize the self-interest of their countries or, often more
specifically, powerful constituents therein. Consider the words of Andrew Moravcsik in his seminal inter governmentalist analysis of the EU: 'on not a single
major issue', Moravcsik wrote in reference to all major agreements in the history
of the EU, 'did governments take a position openly opposed by a major peak
industrial, financial, or agricultural interest group' (1998: 475-76). On the
contrary, those agreements lie on the 'Pareto-frontier', a zone where all decisions 'improve welfare' for the actors involved (1998: 25). A number of prominent international relations scholars have put forth similar claims (Mansfield
and Milner 1997j Milner 1997: 77j Haggard 1997: 21, 31), with numerous
investigations of single blocs, especially in Latin America (Kaltenthaler and
Mora 2002: 90, 92; Sanchez 2004: 31) and North America (Cameron and
Tomlin 2000; Mena 2006), offering empirical support.
In the second camp (the sociological one), the focus is on dominant models
and emulation, unforeseen consequences, cognitive shortcuts, spillover effects, and more. In the EU case, arguments abound about path dependency
(Pierson 1996; Ackrill and Kay 2006; Sverdrup 2002; Holzinger and Knill
2002), bureaucratic overreach (Heisenberg and Richmond 2002: 204j Alter
1998: 131), and reinforcing loops between EU institutions and their environments (Sandholtz and Stone Sweet 1998j Bulmer 1998: 373). Evidence on
other blocs is also growing (Mayer 1998j Laursen 2003j Dreiling 2001j Malamud 2005). COMESA and CAN, for instance, exhibit institutional characteristics (courts of justice, for instance) which reflect a desire to look legitimate
(by emulating the EU) rather than practical or functional considerations
(Duina 2010). In Asia, where blocs developed rather late compared to other
regions, observers point to the 'domino effect' as a cause for integration
(Suominen 2009: 31). In the case of NAFfA, increased-though
neither demanded nor expected-coordination,
networks, and policy adjustments in
the member states have developed as a result of further economic integration
(Aspinwall 2009).
The debate will surely continue. For now the conclusion we can draw is quite
clear: no simple, single formulation can really account for the past or predict the
future of blocs. This, of course, has important implications for both the international economy and business actors, as we shall see later in this chapter.

3. Pace of integration
Any rigorous discussion of the pace of integration in various blocs must take
into account the fact that the term 'pace' refers to at least three distinct
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concepts. Our assessment of any given bloc will be quite different depending
on which concept we use.
First, pace can refer to the extent to which formal measures to promote
integration have been implemented in practice. Given certain (and surely
different across blocs) tariff-reduction schedules and other liberalizing initiatives, for instance, have these been followed on time and applied to all
relevant goods? Tariff reduction in NAFTAand CARICOM, for instance, has
been overall timely, but the removal of NTBs has proven less punctual (Hall
and Nelson 2004; O'Brien and Morano-Foadi 2009). In blocs where regulatory
harmonization is required (the EU and Mercosur for example), we see that
some countries (i.e. Denmark) have complied quite well with the law and
others not (i.e. Greece). This suggests that the pace of integration has been
uneven within single blocs. To this, we can add that progress varies across
industrial sectors in a given bloc.
A second measure of 'pace' refers to increases over time in the internal
movement of goods, capital, services, and labour that have taken place since
integration. We are interested here in the practical realization of the ultimate
objectives of blocs. Recent analyses show that the huge increase in (well-implemented) trade deals in Asia, such as AFTA, seems to have done little to intraAsian trade (Economist 2009). It would be odd to suggest that the pace of
integration there has been impressive. On the other hand, intra-regional trade
of goods and investments in NAFTAincreased by 300 per cent between 1994
and 2004 (Pastor 2004: 127). Similar observations apply to the EU, of course,
but also Mercosur and, to a lesser extent, some of the blocs in Africa, such as
SADC and the Economic Community of West African States (Chacha 2008).
Thirdly, and equally importantly, 'pace' can refer to what we may call the
addition of further objectives to the original plans for integration. In a free trade
area, for instance, member states pleased with progress up to date may opt to
pursue a CET. Or industry sectors previously excluded from trade may be taken
up for liberalization, as has happened in AFTA.Expansion beyond the original
objectives seems to have occurred in the EU, APEC (with its new focus on
security), and Mercosur (With its small step towards social security by way of
establishing in 2006 the Structural Convergence Fund). It has not happened, by
contrast, in NAFTA,though we should note that there private actors, politicians, and government officials have worked in transnational committees,
forums, and other formats to seek 'policy coordination' in areas not covered
by NAFTA-efforts aimed at the creation of what observers call'NAFTA-Plus'.
The Principles of Cooperation of May 2000 on bankruptcy proceedings for
transnational companies is one example (Duina 2006b: 11-12).
These three definitions of 'pace' are not mutually exclusive, of course, and
any investigation of the impact of integration on the international economy
and economic actors should take into consideration all of them. Any given
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Table 2.2. Paceof integration in five blocs*
Bloc

Implementation of agreed-upon
integration measures

Increases in intraregional trade

Expansion beyond
original objectives

EU

o

o

NAFTA
AFTA
APEC

+

+

o
o

o

o
o

+

+

o

CAN
• -->

Poor; 0

->

Average; +

->

+

Impressive

bloc, moreover, can be evaluated in light of all three definitions, as Table 2.2,
with its tentative assessment of five representative blocs, suggests.

4. Challenges to nation state integrity
Despite predictions to the contrary, nation states remain the most salient form
of political organization in the world. At the same time, the spread of trading
blocs has generated real challenges to nation states-even when these blocs
have been set up in fully intergovernmental fashion, with limited legal activity and economic objectives, and no explicit political objectives. UnsurprisIngly, given all the differences that set blocs apart, no simple overarching
formulation of these challenges can be advanced. Instead, three important
propositions can be put forth, all, as we shall see later, with implications for
economic actors and the international economy.
Legislative autonomy
Blocs have challenged the ability of nation states to control the content and
direction of domestic law. The most obvious instances concern blocs where
voting processes or judicial proceedings at the regional level can negate the
preferences of any given member state (despite the fact that the resulting
regional law must be complied with at the national level and is thus of
consequence for national law). This happens in the ED because of qualified
majority voting in the Council of Ministers, and in blocs with a supranational
court of justice (CAN, Mercosur, and the ED, for instance) or other supranational institutions with the power to revise or expand upon, in unforeseen
ways, existing regional law.
More subtly, in virtually all blocs integration has been advanced primarily by
the executive branches of national governments. Legislative branches have in
many cases only ratified key agreements. In the case of major treaties, this is
consistent with constitutional provisions and does not amount to a usurpation
of the power of legislatures. But in the case where secondary laws are being
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produced regularly (i.e, CAN, the EU, and COMESA),executive representatives
do acquire unusual powers vis-a-vis their legislative counterparts.
There is a third dynamic at work in most blocs: the unintended and
unforeseen consequences of regional policies and laws. One of the clearest
examples is the expansion of regional law into issue areas not identified nor
targeted as relevant to integration-the
'spillover effect' described by neofunctionalists. Other examples are practices and decisions which unexpectedly follow from existing agreements and decisions. This is what happened in
NAFTAas a result of chapter 11 (which gives foreign investors at times more
power than domestic actors to challenge judicial decisions and laws) (Duina
and Buxbaum 2008), and in the EU in the realm of social policy (Leibfried
and Pierson 1995).
Transnationalization

of politics

Politics in nation states has traditionally been primarily a domestic affair.
Business, trade unions, spedal interest groups, and social movements
have historically focused on national-level issues: industrial regulation, fiscal
policy, social welfare, etc. Moreover, their membership bases have been domestic. Regional integration has altered matters on both fronts: both the objects of
political contention and the actors pursuing them are increasingly regional.
New transnational political spaces have opened up, with potentially major
implications for economic actors and the rise of a global economy.
Examples abound. In October of 1996, union leaders from the four Mercosur member states established the Coordinadora de Centrales Sindicales del
Cono Sur: a 'unified movement of power' fighting against the 'neoliberal'
mission of Mercosur (Calloni 1996; La Iornada 1996). The Coordinadora
has, since its founding, actively voiced its members' positions on a variety of
fronts related to South American integration. In the EU, women's movements
have joined to form several powerful transnational groups to represent their
collective interests regionally. These include the European Women's Lobby,
the European Women Lawyers Association, and the European Federation of
Women Working in the Home (founded in 1990, 2000, and 1983 respectively)
(Duina 2006c).
In NAFTA, in turn, research indicates that 'NAFTA has encouraged the
founding of tri-national labor alliances to confront common employers as
well as less formal linkages around specific problems and broad-based lobbying
and mobilization coalitions' (MacDonald 2003). Businesses, in turn, have
mobilized together across borders to push for policy convergence in areas not
officially targeted by the NAFTAagreements-with policies on transnational
bankruptcy proceedings being a good example (Duina 2006b).

57

Capitalisms and Capitalism in the Twenty-First Century

Secessionist movements
As the history of the ED suggests (Nielsen and Salk 1998), trading blocs
represent 'opportunity structures' (e.g. valuable openings) for the assertion
of separatist or autonomous movements. Those movements have leveraged
blocs to refine their image and visions for the future, and ultimately bolster
their destabilizing claims against their nation states. We need only recall here
the Zapatista uprising, which was launched on the very day that NAFfA came
into effect, or the considerable leveraging of the Parti Quebecois in Canada
and the Scottish National Party of NAFfA and the ED respectively to bolster
their credentials as cosmopolitan, open-minded parties looking to free their
people away from oppressive nation states. Other examples include the Lega
Nord in Italy-for whom the ED represents yet another form of oppression
that would justify isolation for Northern Italy from the rest of the country or
anything bigger than that-and the Convergencia i Unto's embrace of the EU
as modern and more in line with Catalonia than Spain.
These tensions and problems assume a very local and specific character, of
course. What matters for our purposes, however, is that their occurrence can
have very serious implications for economic actors and the evolution of the
global economy, as we will see in the coming pages.

5. Significance for economic actors and
the international economy
Trading blocs are everywhere. While multilateralism has faltered, blocs continue to grow in numbers and, many, in strength as well. There are good
reasons to believe that the twenty-first century will continue to see regionalization, and not globalization, progress the most, despite the efforts of the
WTO and other organizations pushing for multilateralism. We have seen that
blocs appear to be rather simple projects: efforts to liberalize trade among their
member states. Yet we have also learned that they are, in fact, rather complex
entities. What implications, then, do these blocs have for economic actors and
the international economy as a whole?
In the case of economic actors, the most obvious implication is the creation of incentives for regionalization: for the establishment of transnational
structures within the geographical areas covered by those blocs. As firms, for
instance, find it easier to sell and produce within a given bloc, they have
reasons to develop branches, administrative offices, and factories throughout a bloc's member states (Rugman 2005). As labour issues become increasingly the subject of regional-level legislation, trade unions and other affected
groups find it advantageous to establish transnational agendas, membership
58

Trading Blocs in the Twenty-First Century

bases, and structures, as we have already seen in the case of NAFTA,the EV,
and Mercosur. Interest groups-such
as consumer groups or professional
associations-follow
a similar path. This tendency to expand regionallystructurally but also, as a result, in terms of programmes and agendas-has
already been documented empirically, even if with important caveats (Feils
and Rahman 2008; Wei, Andreosso-O'Callaghan, and von Wuntsch 2007;
Kim 2007).
A second obvious implication for economic actors is increased crossnational movement and transactions within the newly created regions. If
barriers to capital movement are removed, for instance, investors' appetite
for stocks, bonds, assets, and real estate within a given bloc typically intensifies. In NAFTA, direct investment from the VS to Mexico grew between
1994 and 2002 by nearly 250 per cent-far more than investments to the EV
or the rest of the world (Economist 2004). On the whole, research indicates
that intra-regional foreign direct investment (FDI) levels have increased
because of integration in the EV, NAFTA,Mercosur, and AFTA (Kreinin and
Plummer 2008). Supply chains, in turn, are stretched beyond national borders, labour mobility can at times increase as professional workers especially
are more inclined to search for employment in the participating member
states, and firms target customers on a more regional, rather than national,
level. Valuable data and information, as well, is exchanged with increasing
frequency across borders among business partners, vendors, and even
competitors."
For the global economy, the most obvious implication of the rise of trading
blocs concerns their contribution towards the making of a single, international
marketplace. Here, however, the evidence has been contradictory. According to
some researchers, blocs represent stepping stones or learning 'laboratories'
bound to prepare countries for participation in the global economy (Summers
1991; Gordon 2003: 112j Cable 1994: 12). But other observers have disagreed,
arguing that blocs are protectionist and trade 'diverting' projects which at best
slow down the rise of the international economy or at worst make it impossible
(Bhagwati 2008j Frankel 1997: 214). Arguments put forth by the latter group
have found support in works showing that most trade and FDI happens in very
specific regions of the world-most notably Europe, North America, and East
Asia (Hirst, Thompson, and Bromley 2009; Rugman and Verbeke 2004).
Yet, we must take the complexity of trading blocs into account when
reflecting on these matters. Surely, not all blocs will have the same impact
on either economic actors or the rise of a global economy. In the case of
economic actors, for instance, consider the fact that a 2007-2008 Asian
5 For representative studies, see Coeurdacier, De Santis, and Aviat (2009), Dumont (200S), and
Sciglimpaglia and Saghafi (2004).
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Development Bank survey of exporters in]apan, South Korea, Singapore, and
Thailand found that only 22 per cent reported taking advantage of the blocs in
which they operate (Economist 2009). This contradicts the idea that all blocs
encourage firms, interest groups, and others to expand their operations across
member states (as reasons for their choices, firm leaders listed confusion about
overlapping trade agreements and costs of compliance with overly complex
regulations). Or consider recent research on CAN indicating that integration
has actually led to lower FDI movement in the region (Paez 2008). Regionalization does not happen everywhere, then. Our preceding discussion of complexity suggests, therefore, that much can be gained by considering one key
question: how is each dimension of complexity likely to shape-mediate, limit,

magnify, etc.-the regionalization of economic actors and the rise of a global economy? We can only begin to address the most important dynamics here. Table
2.3 lists each dimension and its impact on the expansion of economic actors
and the rise of the global economy.
We turn to economic actors first.
Table 2.3. Economic implications of differentiated integration
Dimensions of
Complexity

Expansion of Economic Actors
More Likely ...

Relevance for the Global Economy

Economic Objectives

· .. in targeted industry
sectors

Blocs can promote protectionism in
given sectors; CET can be either a barrier
or facilitating factor

Frameworks fit
Policies

· .. when regulatory
harmonization also takes
place

Blocs under pressure to comply with
WTO frameworks

Political Purposes

· .. among interest groups
especially if bloc espouses
political objectives

Blocs now represent, bargain, and set
objectives for themselves at the WTO and
other multilateral forums

Legitimacy

· .. if legitimacy is high

Struggling blocs may help
multilateral ism; successful blocs may
undermine it

Rational vs. NonRational Drivers

· .. when overall pressures for
integration are predictable

'Stickiness' of existing agreements, if
unwanted or unplanned, can hinder
multilateralism

Pace of Integration

· .. if pace is rapid

Impact a function of overall influence
(positive or negative) of blocs on global
economy

Legislative
Autonomy of Nation
States

... if law-making becomes an
increasingly regional affair

As regional law and institutions become
the object of attention at the WTO and
other multilateral forums, nation states
matter less

Transnationalization
of Politics

· .. when loci of contention
are transnational

If politics becomes regionalized, then
WTO and other multilateral forums lose
relevance

Secessionist
Movements

· .. if secessionist movements
do not pursue protectionism

Positive for global economy if
movements embrace multilateralism
instead of regional integration
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Economic actors
How does each dimension of complexity affect economic actors in trading
blocs? When it comes to economic objectives, recall that in most blocs some
sectors of the economy are exempt from trade liberalization. Liberalization in
other sectors is instead being pursued aggressively. If so, within a bloc, we are
likely to see the selective expansion of economic actors. Some actors-those in
sectors undergoing liberalization-pursue
expansion; others-those
in protected sectors-do not. This applies to firms but also to interest groups, trade
unions, and other actors. Recent research on firms in the dairy industry and on
women's groups in the ED, Mercosur, and NAFfA supports this (Duina 2006a).
Exceptions exist, of course. For instance, some actors may forge transnational
ties with others precisely to pressure bloc officials to liberalize their sector. But
in most cases such activities will probably amount to network building and
not actual structural expansions.
Second, as to frameworks and policies, we saw that officials use a variety of
tools to pursue trade liberalization. Each option has implications: all things
being equal, regulatory harmonization and other more sophisticated tools for
trade liberalization offer strong incentives for transnational expansion,
though of course a number of other factors determine firms' decision to
expand abroad:" harmonization, after all, lowers production compliance
costs while making products from one country more easily accepted in
another. Reliance on tariff reduction, by contrast, only generates relatively
light incentives for expansion. The same can be said for labour movement,
especially professionals: harmonization of training and qualification requirements does much to promote cross-border migration.
Third, political purposes, in particular those with consequences for the economy, can stimulate the expansion of economic actors, especially interest
groups. Consider, for instance, blocs that aim at the coordination of policies
in areas such as foreign immigration, unemployment, or defence. A variety of
stakeholders-such as labour unions and high technology fums-would have
reasons to establish cross-national networks, objectives, offices, and more.
They will also have incentives to form alliances with their counterparts in
other member states, which can possibly lead to more permanent arrangements (such as mergers) later. When war prevention figures among the priorities of a bloc, this (provided it is pursued in practice) will generate more
stability and thus, as the literature on FDI and political stability shows (Kolstad
and Villanger 2008), more reasons for actors to reach beyond their national
borders.

6 Research on determinants of FDI is extensive and stresses factors such as regulatory quality,
national growth rates, and market size. See, for instance, Torrisi et at. (2008).
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But, of course, all of the above considerations are more likely to hold if there
is widespread agreement that the bloc in question is legitimate. They are also
likely to hold if the various stakeholders perceive that the forces pushing
integration forward are not uncontrollable or unpredictable but in fact follow
a transparent logic (rational versus non-rational drivers), and that integration is
indeed taking place at a good or at least reasonable pace, however defined.
What about the integrity of the member states? Loss of legislative autonomy
by itself may have little direct impact on actors' structural organization.
However, if it is a reflection of the increasing importance of the regional
level as the locus of legislative activity, it is bound to encourage actors affected
by the relevant laws to expand. Like-minded stakeholders from across the
member states are bound to join forces and lobby bloc officials. Thus, actors
will surely have reasons to expand if political activity has become transnationalized. Interest groups such as industry associations will establish a presence in
whatever sites is necessary, and develop regional-level agendas and membership bases (Doh 1999; Greenwood 2003).
Lastly, the strengthening of secessionist movements in trading blocs generally
creates disincentives for firms to expand, since these movements generally
create uncertainty (political, regulatory, and economic). If firms have reasons
to believe that a section of a country is moving towards autonomy or even
independence, they may actually decide to move away from that region. The
experience of Quebec in the 1990s, when many Anglophone firms threatened
to pull out from the province, supports this point (Symonds 1996). And,
interestingly, for those that have relocated from Quebec, stock market investors
rewarded them with increased valuations (Tirtiroglu, Bhabra, and LeI 2004).
International

economy

A major strand of research suggests that regional blocs present-via protectionism and trade diversion-major threats to the international economy. If accurate,
could this observation apply to all blocs? Differences in economic objectives among
blocs will actually determine to a good extent whether protectionism and trade
diversion materialize, or whether the opposite may in fact happen. The erection
of CETs in common markets is a particularly salient matter, but so are a bloc's
position vis-a-vis subsidies, quotas, rules of origin, and fiscal incentives. Any
claim about the positive or negative impact of blocs for the international economy must take such differences into account. Extensive and oftentimes contradictory research on all of these variables already exists, of course," but not in the
context of a comprehensive, comparative discussion of blocs.

7
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Objectives are achieved through frameworks and policies. These have enormous implications for the WTO and other multilateral negotiation forums.
Complex regulatory environments at the regional level (i.e. the EU, CAN, or
Mercosur) but also simpler ones (such as NAFfA) must be compatible with
WTO frameworks if agreements are to be reached at the global level. Thus,
once again, we must examine closely those frameworks and polides. And, in
so doing, we must also recognize that in some cases they empower bloc
offidals to represent the collectivity of their member states in international
negotiations (the cases of the EU and AFfA come to mind), while in other
cases this does not happen (Narlikar 2003: 159). When it comes to political
purposes, therefore, we see that some blocs have formed predsely with the
objective of having more power at the WTO negotiating tables, while others
have not (Odell 2006).
But, of course, little of the above could be said if blocs lacked legitimacy.
Blocs with little legitimacy are unlikely to really matter at the WTO or
elsewhere, regardless of formal mandates or agreements. At the same time,
blocs whose origins and evolutions appear to have followed less than rational
courses present challenges of their own. Institutions are sticky, and blocs
whose objectives and structure have emerged out of isomorphic, pathdependent, mimetic, or other dynamics often prove more difficult to change
than those driven by primarily 'rational' forces, as evidence from the EU
shows (Sandholtz and Stone Sweet 1998). Moreover, the evolution of those
blocs may prove difficult to control. This, too, may generate challenges to
the rise of a global economy.
When it comes to the pace of integration, we must first consider a bloc's
overall impact on the global economy. If countries in a bloc prove, despite
GATT's requirements, more protectionist towards third parties than before
integration, fast pace only makes matters worse for the WTO and multilateralism. But if the pace is slow, it may undermine the project as a whole and
motivate member state representatives to seek alternative (bilateral or multilateral) paths. On the other hand, if a given bloc is indeed functioning as a
stepping stone for further inclusion in the global economy, then fast pace is
certainly positive for multilateralism, while a slower pace may push member
states to leave the bloc and seek alternative arrangements which may, or may
not, be benefidal for multilateralism. Determining, with accuracy, whether a
bloc is beneficial or harmful for the global economy is not a simple task, but
finding examples of countries actually making claims to that effect and then
threatening to leave out of frustration with progress is easier. In Mercosur,
both Paraguay and Uruguay have repeatedly voiced dissatisfaction at the
protectionist tendendes of Brazil and the resulting lack of interest, for Mercosur as a whole, in negotiating trade agreements with other countries-and the
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United States especially (Economist 2005, pp. 36-7; MercoPress 2001; BBC
Monitoring 2002).
Finally, we discussed the various ways in which blocs can challenge the
integrity of nation states. National legislative autonomy and the transnationalization of politics are relevant for the global economy in quite similar
ways: if indeed law and politics are regionalizing, then the WTO and other
multilateral forums must increasingly turn to blocs for the pursuit of their
visions. Moreover, such a regionalization is likely to lead to a diversion of
political resources and capital away from multilateral venues, with negative
implication for how quickly global agreements can be reached. As Bhagwati
put it, 'lobbying support and political energies can readily be diverted to
preferential trading arrangements such as FTAs [free trade agreements] ...
That deprives the multilateral system of the support it needs to survive,
let alone be conducive to further liberalization' (Bhagwati 1993: 162). As
to secessionist movements, the critical variable is their stance towards openness and multilateralism. When blocs invigorate these movements, the
position of these movements towards the global economy certainly assumes
greater importance.
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